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Impact on Ethanol, Corn, and Livestock from Imminent 
U.S. Ethanol Policy Decisions  
 
by Bruce A. Babcock 
 
The next few weeks should bring some clarity to the future of the 45-cent-per-gallon 
ethanol tax credit and the 54-cent-per-gallon import tariff because both are scheduled to 
expire on December 31. Although the arguments in support of and against their 
extension have changed little since the summer, the economic situation in the corn, 
livestock, and ethanol industries has changed dramatically. Heavy summer rains and 
some excessive heat resulted in lower-than-expected U.S. corn yields. These lower yields, 
combined with the failure of the Russian wheat crop and a weaker U.S. dollar, increased 
corn prices by about 50% in just six months. What began as a year with a bright outlook 
for corn farmers is turning out to be their best year on record. And while we might expect 
the ethanol industry to be hurt by high corn prices, the $2.00-per-bushel increase in 
corn prices has been accompanied by a 70-cent-per-gallon increase in the price of 
ethanol. The net result of these price changes is that profits for the ethanol industry have 
actually increased. Positive profits for the ethanol industry mean that the industry’s 
demand for corn has increased despite a significant drop in the U.S. supply of corn. With 
no rationing of demand from the ethanol industry, the burden of coping with the higher 
corn prices falls on other users of corn, namely, the domestic livestock and food 
industries, and foreign importers. 
 
Since the price of corn has changed, the trade-offs involved in extending the tax credit 
and import tariff have also likely changed. It would seem that the domestic livestock 
sector now has a higher stake in whether the tax credit and import tariffs are extended 
because if they are not extended, this could moderate the ethanol industry’s corn 
demand. However, high crude oil prices combined with a 12.6-billion-gallon ethanol 
mandate in 2011 translate into robust corn demand by the domestic ethanol industry 
even if the tax credit is not extended. Corn use by the ethanol industry would only be 
reduced if the tariff was eliminated and imports of Brazilian ethanol dramatically 
increased. But, as pointed out in a recent CARD staff report (Babcock, Barr, and 
Carriquiry1), robust domestic demand for ethanol in Brazil, combined with a strong 
Brazilian currency, reduces the amount that Brazilians want to export to the U.S. Thus, 
the impacts on the U.S. corn and ethanol industries from not extending the tax credit 
and the import tariff may be modest. Insight into what would happen in 2011 under 
alternative ethanol policies can be obtained by updating the CARD model to reflect 
current market conditions. Before exploring what the model says, let’s look at the impact 
of the increase in corn and soybean meal prices on the domestic livestock sector.  
 
                                                            
1 Babcock, B.A., K.J. Barr, and M. Carriquiry, “Costs and Benefits to Taxpayers, Consumers, and Producers 
from U.S. Ethanol Policies,” Staff Report 10-SR 106, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa 
State University, July 2010. 
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Impact of Higher Feed Prices on Livestock Production Costs 
The price of corn is the most important factor in determining the cost of feeding 
livestock. Because corn is the dominant feed ingredient that provides energy, it serves as 
the reference price for other carbohydrate sources, such as barley, grain sorghum, and 
feed wheat. And because soybeans and corn compete for land, when the price of corn 
increases, so does the price of soybeans, which in turn increases the price of soybean 
meal—the reference price of protein in livestock feed. Soybean meal prices have 
increased by almost $90 per ton, or by about 30%. 
 
Table 1 shows the impact of higher corn and soybean meal prices on the cost of feeding 
livestock. The quantities of feed reflect representative feed quantities that were obtained 
from a variety of sources, including the feed rations in Livestock Gross Margin insurance 
contracts for dairy, fed cattle, and hogs. Table 2 shows these feed costs multiplied by the 
price increases for corn ($2/bu) and soybean meal ($90/ton) that have occurred since 
April. As shown, the cost of producing 100 pounds of milk has increased by almost 
$4.00. The cost of producing a pound of meat has increased between about 7 cents (for 
broilers) to 24 cents (for beef). And the cost of producing a dozen eggs has increased by 
12 cents. If feed costs stay at current levels, then food costs will eventually reflect these 
increased production costs. 
 
The increased production costs shown in Table 2 will hurt the financial outlook of the 
U.S. livestock sector. In response, herds will shrink and prices at the producer, 
 
Table 1. Quantity of corn and soybean meal used to produce U.S. livestock 
  Quantity of Feed per Unit of Production 
Livestock 
Type Unit of Production Corn (pounds) 
Soybean Meal 
(pounds) 
Hogs 250 pounds liveweight 784 200 
Fed Cattle 500 pounds liveweight 3,360 0 
Dairy 100 pounds of milk 72 26 
Layers Dozen eggs 2.3 0.75 
Broilers One pound liveweight 1.25 0.5 
Notes: Hog numbers reflect feed for sows and feeder pigs. Dairy cattle numbers reflect feed for dry cows, 
replacement heifers, and hospital cows. 
 
Table 2. Change in the cost of feeding U.S. livestock since the summer of 2010 
  
Increased Cost of Feed 
($/production unit)   
Livestock 
Type Unit of Production Corn 
Soybean 
Meal Total 
Farm 
Price 
% of 
Price 
Hogs Per pound liveweight 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.56  27% 
Fed Cattle Per pound liveweight 0.24 0.00 0.24 1.00  24% 
Dairy 100 pounds of milk 2.57 1.17 3.74 18.00  21% 
Layers Per dozen eggs 0.08 0.04 0.12 1.00  12% 
Broilers Per pound liveweight 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.85  8% 
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wholesale, and retail levels will eventually rise to reflect these higher production costs. 
But to what extent could the decision about whether to extend the tax credit and import 
tariff moderate the production cost increases? 
 
Impact of the Tax Credit and Import Tariff on the Price of Corn 
Calculation of the impact of removing the tax credit and the import tariff is not 
straightforward because the ethanol mandate needs to be accounted for. If the market 
demand for ethanol with the tax credit and import tariff in place is not strong enough to 
push U.S. ethanol production beyond mandated levels, then removal of these supports 
will not have any impact because the mandate would then determine production levels. 
If the tax credit and import tariff push use of ethanol beyond the 2011 mandate, then 
their removal will cause ethanol production to decline to the mandated level, with 
resulting decreases in the prices of corn and ethanol. Whether the mandate is binding or 
not depends primarily on the price of gasoline and the degree to which the U.S. market 
for ethanol is saturated because of the 10% blending limit. If gasoline prices move 
higher, then the tax credit will stimulate production beyond mandated levels and the 
price of corn will increase. If gasoline prices drop, then the mandate will bind even with 
the tax credit in place, and its removal will not lower feed costs. 
 
Because we do not know what the price of gasoline will be in 2011, to capture the 
complexities of the policy and the market for ethanol requires a stochastic model. Our 
model of corn and ethanol markets described earlier was recalibrated to current market 
conditions and modified slightly. The model was calibrated using the November USDA 
World Supply and Demand Estimates. The USDA projects increased export demand and 
reduced U.S. domestic supply relative to what it projected this summer. One change in 
the model is that the willingness to pay for ethanol by blenders was increased a bit to 
reflect the fact that the price of ethanol has exceeded the price of gasoline for the last few 
months. This strength in ethanol prices is surprising given that many observers feel that 
the U.S. market for ethanol at current production levels is almost completely saturated.2  
 
The recalibrated and modified model was for 5,000 different gasoline prices to capture 
the uncertainty about future gasoline prices. Table 3 shows the average of these 5,000 
runs. The first row of results shows what will happen if the mandate, the tax credit, and 
                                                            
2 There are a number of possible explanations for this unexpected high price. Blenders’ maximum 
willingness to pay for ethanol could equal the gasoline price plus the tax credit. This relationship 
between ethanol and gasoline prices can only exist if a lack of competition between blenders 
allows them to charge consumers for a gallon of ethanol as if it had the same energy content as 
gasoline. Another explanation is that blenders want to buy large quantities of ethanol in 2010 
because they fear that the tax credit is going to expire. Buying ethanol in 2010 allows them to 
capture the tax credit today and to generate a renewable identification number (RIN) that they 
can use in 2011. A third explanation for the strong price is that ethanol is being blended with a 
splash of gasoline in the U.S., thereby capturing the blenders tax credit, and the resulting  blend is 
exported to a region, such as Europe, where the market for ethanol is not saturated. The Financial 
Times (Nov. 14, 2010) reports that this is occurring for at least a portion of U.S. exports. And 
lastly, the price could be strong because the mandate is binding and RIN prices are high. This last 
explanation is not consistent with the fact that ethanol production in 2010 will exceed mandated 
levels. 
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the import tariff are maintained. The second row of results shows what will happen, on 
average, if the tax credit and import tariff are allowed to expire but the mandate is kept 
in place. As shown, U.S. ethanol production drops by an average of 600 million gallons. 
Ethanol imports increase by an average of 120 million gallons. And the price of corn 
drops by 35 cents per bushel, or by an average of 6.8%. The average cost of meeting the 
mandate, as measured by the average RIN price, increases by 28 cents per gallon.  
 
The modest drop in the average price of corn reveals that there is a good chance that the 
mandate in 2011 will be binding even if ethanol demand is subsidized with the tax credit. 
An examination of each of the 5,000 model solutions shows that 45% of the solutions 
have U.S. ethanol consumption at mandated levels. This means that there is almost a 
50% chance that there will be no 2011 impact on corn prices and U.S. ethanol 
consumption if the tax credit and import tariff are not extended.  
 
If the tax credit and import tariff are extended at their current levels, then there is a 55% 
chance that ethanol demand will be stimulated beyond mandated levels. On average, the 
amount of U.S. ethanol consumption that will be stimulated beyond the mandate from 
the tax credit in 2011 is 600 million gallons. Dividing the $5.95 billion taxpayer cost of 
extending the tax credit in 2011 by the additional ethanol produced results in a taxpayer 
cost of just under $10 per gallon of additional ethanol. This shows that most of the 
benefit of the tax credit flows to oil companies and perhaps to fuel consumers to the 
extent that blended gasoline prices reflect the tax credit. 
 
Table 3 also reports the results if there is no mandate in 2011. This could occur if the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is asked to waive the 2011 mandate and the 
waiver is granted. In 2008, Texas governor Rick Perry requested just such a waiver, but 
the EPA denied the request. With no mandate in 2011, U.S. ethanol production would 
decline by another 1.7 billion gallons. This decline would free up about 460 million net 
bushels (net of the drop in distillers grains production) of corn for domestic and foreign 
livestock feeders. The drop in demand from the ethanol industry would reduce average 
corn prices to $3.84 per bushel. This decline in corn prices would make the corn ethanol 
industry more competitive so that it would still be profitable to produce almost 11 billion 
gallons of corn ethanol despite a significantly lower ethanol price. 
 
Table 3. Average results for ethanol policy scenarios in 2011  
 
Corn 
Price 
U.S. 
Ethanol 
Pricea 
RINb 
Price 
U.S. 
Ethanol 
Production 
Imported 
Ethanol 
Ethanol Policies in Place ($/bu) ($/gal) ($/gal) (BGc) (MGd) 
Mandate, Tax Credit, Tariff 5.21 2.18 0.12 13.22 90 
Mandate Only 4.86 2.05 0.40 12.62 210 
No Programs 3.84 1.78 0.0 10.92 90 
aAverage U.S. wholesale price, including any RIN price. 
bRenewable Identification Number. 
cBillion gallons. 
dMillion gallons. 
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A drop of about 7% in the price of corn from elimination of the tax credit and import 
tariffs would help the livestock industry. But corn and feed prices would stay high 
because of the mandate. Only if the mandate is waived in 2011 would corn prices fall 
significantly. Table 4 calculates the change in feed costs under the three policy options 
considered in Table 3. As shown, the livestock industry would still be faced with higher 
feed costs even if all ethanol subsidies were eliminated and the mandate was waived. 
Strong world demand for U.S. corn combined with a competitive ethanol industry would 
still increase 2011 feed costs. However, the magnitude of the cost increase would be 
much lower than if all ethanol programs were kept in place.  
 
Table 4. Increased cost of 2011 feed under different ethanol policies 
Livestock 
Type 
 Maintain Current 
Policy 
Mandate 
Only 
No  
Programs 
Unit of Production ($ per production unit) 
Hogs Per pound liveweight 0.15 0.12 0.06 
Fed Cattle Per pound liveweight 0.24 0.20 0.09 
Dairy Cattle Per 100 pound of milk 3.74 3.09 1.42 
Laying Hens Per dozen eggs 0.12 0.10 0.05 
Broilers Per pound liveweight 0.07 0.06 0.03 
Note: Calculations assume that the soybean meal price increase since the summer would be reduced by the 
same percentage as the price of corn. Justification for this assumption is that lower corn prices would 
decrease soybean prices because of lower land competition in 2011. Lower soybean prices would then 
decrease soybean meal prices. 
 
 
The Policy Choice 
Because ethanol substitutes closely for gasoline, its market demand is much more 
sensitive to price than is the demand for livestock feed. This means that if markets were 
free to adjust, then it would be the ethanol market that would do most of the adjusting to 
feed grain supply shocks. If corn supplies were tight, ethanol production would decline 
and gasoline blenders would reduce the percentage of ethanol in their blends. This 
reduction would free up corn for livestock feeders, and the price impacts on feed markets 
would be relatively small. If corn supplies were plentiful and corn prices would otherwise 
drop dramatically (animals can only eat so much corn), the ethanol industry would ramp 
up production and blenders would find it profitable to increase the percentage of ethanol 
in their blends. The surplus of corn would be much smaller, thereby ameliorating the 
price drop. Looking to the future, excess capacity in the ethanol industry has the 
potential to dramatically stabilize corn prices. Instead of facing an inelastic demand, 
corn producers would face an elastic demand, thereby decreasing price volatility. 
 
The EPA’s recent policy decision to allow higher blends in the U.S. gasoline supply 
should facilitate blenders’ freedom to take advantage of inexpensive ethanol when corn 
supplies are abundant. However, ethanol mandates, demand subsidies, and import 
barriers reduce the ability of world feed markets to cope with unexpected supply 
disruptions by forcing most of the adjustment to take place in the livestock industry 
rather than in the ethanol industry. Because the demand for livestock feed is relatively 
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price insensitive (demand is inelastic), supply disruptions such as a failure of the Russian 
wheat crop can have large impacts on feed costs, with resulting financial difficulties of 
livestock feeders. The dramatic increases in the prices of corn and soybean meal that we 
are currently experiencing are a direct result of our current ethanol policy, which forces 
demand adjustments in the livestock sector rather than in the sector (blended gasoline) 
that can more easily adjust.  
 
The recent corn and soybean price increases have starkly revealed the economic 
consequences of U.S. ethanol policy. Congress faces a decision about stimulating 
demand for domestic corn ethanol through subsidies and taxes on imported ethanol 
when corn prices are already so high. If Congress decides that it does not make sense to 
stimulate demand when supply is short, then allowing the tax credit and import tariff to 
expire on schedule makes sense.  
 
A decision to let the tax credit expire may not be that difficult politically because the 
credit’s effects are so modest. It will cost taxpayers about $10 for each additional gallon 
of ethanol that is stimulated by the tax credit. And there is no better time to let the 
import tariff expire because there is so little Brazilian ethanol available for export. Strong 
domestic demand in Brazil, high prices for sugar, and a strong Brazilian currency all 
have worked to limit the availability of Brazilian ethanol in export markets.  
 
The results reported here also show that if stability in feed costs is a policy objective, 
then waiving the mandate in years of tight corn supplies would allow the fuel sector to 
help absorb corn supply disruptions rather than burdening only the livestock sector. 
Because the ethanol mandate creates a floor on ethanol demand, the fuel sector cannot 
help limit the economic consequences of tight supplies on the U.S. and world food 
sectors. A more flexible policy on mandates would complement the policy decision to 
allow higher blends in our fuel supplies. Moving toward an ethanol policy that allows 
blends to adjust to the relative price of ethanol and gasoline might become attractive if 
U.S. corn production cannot keep pace with domestic and world demand.  
 
 
Bruce A. Babcock is a professor of economics at Iowa State University and director of 
the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development. 
